NIA 9th Meeting

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COORDINATION OF INTELLICATION ACTI (IT 13 RELATING TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY INTULLIG NO DEVELOPMENTS AND POTENTIALITIES

SECRETARY PATTERSON gave a brief replit on the present status of N.I.A. 6. He stated that the Atomic lacrey Commission desired to retain three people to go over life retical contained in the files to be transferred to the Central diteiligence Group. He said that these three people were to search hese files for information pertaining to uranium deposits and men information was to be retained by the Commission. Secretar Parterson suggested that C.I.G. take up the matter of the transfer of the personnel with Mr. Lilienthal.

After some discussion,
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHOR TY:
Agreed to the transfer of the personnal mentioned in N.I.A. 6 and direct do to percetor of Central Intelligence to work out the details with Mr. Liliantial (Transfer subsequently completes on ab February 1947)

REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF CHUTE L I FILL CHMCE

stated that his last report was rather compressive in pointing out the accomplishments of C.I.G. since its inception. However, this time he wished to report sore of the difficulties encountered by C.I.G. He said that before taking up these difficulties he wished to point out a few accomplishments recently effected by C.I.G.

that the C.I.G. take over the activities of the ferral Bureau of Investigation in the South American field oner was some doubt as to whether C.I.G. could ably accomplish this assignment. He mentioned that he had received a latter from Ambassador Pauley which commended the smooth transfer of these activities accomplished by the C.I.G. representative attached to his staff. General Vandenberg also mentioned that Mr.

Dawson of the State Department had also state that the

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C.I.G.'s representatives who had replace the F.B.1. personnel were of a particularly high type. Gener 1 and enterg brought out the point that C.I.G. had a roving mass on to check these newly assigned personnel in South America are their reports indicated that they were carrying out their functions in an exemplary manner.

exemplary manner, 25X1

GENERAL VANDEMBERG pointed out that 3.T.G. was coordinating the exploitation of documents solucities in the Far Fast and that plans are now being completed for similar exploitation of documents from Europe.

some of the principal difficulties being encountered by C.I.G. in its operations. He said that what he believed to be essential coordination to reduce duplication had been retarded by an uncertainty as to the directive authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. He said that the President specified that the Director of Central Intelligence shall "lan for the coordination of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies of the departments as relate to the national security and recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such overall policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission." (Paragraph 3 of President's letter of 2) January 1946, emphasis added)

GENERAL VANDENBERG further stated that the National Intelligence Authority specified that: "I see mends tions approved by this Authority will where practicable approved the intelligence activities of the separate departments represented herein. The members of the Intelligence Advisory Board will each be responsible for insuring that approved recommendations are executed within their respective departments." (NI. Directive No. 1, par. 4)

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that the National Intelligence Authority specified that: "The Director of Control Intelligence is hereby authorized and directed to act for this Authority in coordinating all federal foreign activities related to the national security to insure that the overall colicies and objectives established by this Authority are properly implemented and executed." (NIA Directive No. 5, par. 3, captable added)

of the agencies (Intelligence Advisory Board) that he current interpretation of coordination was "by mutual agreement."

This placed the Director of Central Intelligents only in the position of an executive secretary to the L.A.B. and that he did not believe this was what was contemplated by the N.I.A.

General Vandenberg then pointed out that ir some instances it

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had taken six to eight months to get agreement as a paper. He stated that in order to rectify this he economical d that the Director of Central Intelligence be considered as having authority similar to that given to the Joint Baloaren and Development Board - "The Joint Research on Development Board shall operate within its jurisdiction as a remove of the Secretaries of War and Navy and the necessary outhority is hereby delegated by the Scoretaries of War and News to the Board so that its decisions, orders and dire; ives shall be considered as emanating from them and shall asve sull force and effect as such." (JRDB 1/1, 6 June 94, as mended 3

GENERAL VANDE BERG suggested hat as a siternative July 1946) to the above recommendation that C.T.G. forward its implementing directives to the N.I.A. members for specificat assuance from their offices. However, such a practice voile of cumbersome and involve a great loss of time on the Part of all concerned.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that the production of strategic and national policy intellipence had been hindered further by an uncertainty among the egencies es to its definition. In order to clarify this liturtion C.I.G. had developed the following definition, this he requested the N.I.A. approve: "Strategic and ration 1 policy intelligence is that composite intelligence, laterde remarkal in character, which is required by the Presi er and ther high officers and staffs to assist them in determ ni & policies with respect to national planning and security and for the advancement of broad national oller. t is in that political-coonomic-military area of careern to more than one agency, must be objective, and must transhed the exclusive competence of any one department.

GENERAL WANDENBERG state i Mas is understanding that those persons who developed the Lan for the creation of a Central Intelligence Group had is miss that the C.I.G. would replace the Joint Intelligence C mm tto.. This, so far, had not taken place, nor had any working relationship been achieved further, that J.I.C. continues to have responsibilities paral-Iteling those of C.I.G., and until this is resolved, complete coordination, effectiveness, and efficiency in the national intelligence mission can not be attained. General Vandenberg recommended that J.I.C. be abolished, and that C.I.G. provide the necessary intelligence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said, however, he believed that some members of the J.C.S. had stated that if this were done, it would lower the original concept of a Central Intelligence Group. General Vandenberg said it was difficult for him, in appearing before appropriation committees, to defend C.I.G.'s request for finds since he was constantly confronted with the qu steenes to the amount of overlap in intelligence. It was his and retaining that one of the principal tasks expected of the proofer of Central Intelligence was the reduction of such ever ap to an absolute minimum.

GENERAL VANDEMBERG stated he would also like to point out that when C.I.G. went to the intelligence agencies of the War and Navy Departments for information, there was constant friction as to whether J.I.C. or C.I.G. should have priority. In short, two agencies were asking for he same type of intelligence but requested in a slightly different manner. This duplication was unnecessary and occupied the three of personnel which should be engaged in more productive antelligence activities.

SECRETARY FOR ESTAL then aske whether the question of dissolution of the J.I.C. and the assignment of its duties to C.I.G. had been taken up with the J in Chaess of Staff.

GENERAL VANDENBERG answered that it believed it had through the I.A.B. members.

MR. EDDY stated that he thought and is was important now to abolish J.I.C. and to have all introdepertmental intelligence under the C.I.G.

After some discussion,

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTEORI'Y:

- a. Agreed that while they believed that the J.I.C. should be abolished and it fanitions assumed by C.I.G., they desired to we take the decision until such time as it has been discussed with the Joint Chiefs of State.
 - b. Noted that Admiral Leahy would the up this matter with the Joint Chiefe of Staff.

At Secretary Marshall's request, JET TO A DENBERG then reread his first recommendation.

SECRETARY PATTERSON stated that Gravio alternative to the N.I.A. approving this recommendation. We exided, however, that a proviso should be inserted in the Germand tion to allow any aggricued agency to appeal to the .l... through that agency's respective decretary.

GENERAL VANDETBERG said it was realised that each agency has the inherent right to appeal that its respective Secretary any objection to a specific directive.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that he resonated approval, but that he was in agreement with Scoret ry fille son's provise.

SECRET.RY F.TTERSON raised the decision at the whether General Vandenberg's recommendation would be seen of the entering into the field of operation lateral algebras of the agencies.

GENERAL VANDINGERG stated that this was not the intent.

MR. FDDY asked, if authority was as each od by the

N.I.A. to the Director of Central Intel ignize that his

directives shall be considered as cram the from them, would such authority be interpreted to allow he have are of Central Intelligence to draft personnel from the considered as to perform specific jobs.

GENERAL VANDEMBERG stated that C. I d no intention of interpreting this authority as indicated by Fa. Eddy.

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SECRETARY PATTER 30N asked if C. G. a contemplating recommending that some of the intelligen above published by the intelligene agencies of the continued.

GENERAL VANDENEERS stated he would be have an opportunity to look over these publications of a enswering this question.

SECRETARY FORRES VL stated h. b. ic and it the proviso to be added to General Valdenberg's r.co en the inder discussion should read along the following in a provided in cases of objection to specific action:

y cad agency may have access to that a gency's Scor to the specific action to the N.I.A."

MR. EDDY stated is assumed that ny lies was, before being issued by C.I.G., would normall the control of discussion by the Intelligence Advisory Board.

GENERAL VANDENBERG concurred.

THE NATIONAL INTILICENCE AU EXITY

Approved the resummendation that me and a stor

of Central Intel i cenes shall in the ten

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Secretary and the test aim to the v.

At Secretary Mark 11's riques of in mamage then repeated his recommended definition of the end national policy intelligenty."

After some discussion, in which in the Vocamberg pointed out the reason why an approved as init at if this term

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was needed,

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:
Approved the following definition: "Strategic and national policy intelligence is that composite intelligence, interdepartmental in character, which is required by the President and other high officers and staffs to assist them in determining policies with respect to national planning and security in peace and in war and for the advancement of broad national policy. It is in that political-economic-military area of concern to more than one agency, must be objective, and must transcend the exclusive competence of any one department."

tion Congressman Taber was concerned from a security standpoint with reference to appropriations for intelligence
activities. Secretary Marshall further stated that Mr.

Taber had said that it appeared to him that too many people
had to be consulted in considering such appropriations.

Secretary Marshall went on to state that he believed the
best way to maintain proper security was for the President
or the Secretary of State to control these funds, and that
a request should be made for a flat appropriation.

before a joint committee, which he was told before appearance would consist of four or five people. However, upon arrival he found there were actually twenty-two people present. He went on to state a subsequent meeting had been called and he would continue to be careful of the information presented. However, he agreed that security of intelligence operations could best be protected by funds which should be concealed and appropriated in a lump sum controlled by one person.